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Abstract—This paper presents a formal approach to modelling
and analysis of data and control flow dependencies between
services within remotely deployed distributed systems of services.
Our work aims at elaborating for a concrete system, which parts
of the system (or system model) are necessary to check a given
property. The approach allows services decomposition oriented
towards efficient checking of system properties as well as analysis
of dependencies within a system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This approach originated from the analysis of two case
studies from automotive area, which were developed together
with industrial partners within DenTUM and Verisoft-XT1
projects. The first case study [1], developing an Adaptive
Cruise Control system with Pre-Crash Safety functionality, was
motivated and supported by DENSO Corporation, the second
case study [2], developing a Cruise Control System with
focus on system architecture and verification, was supported
by Robert Bosch GmbH. One of the essential questions we
have investigated during this analysis was which part of the
system functionality do we need to analyse to check a certain
property in sense of monitoring, testing or formal verification.
In most cases, we don’t need complete information about the
system as a whole to analyse certain aspects or to check certain
properties. The problem is how to find which local information
(at the level of one or more components or subsystems) is
sufficient for this check, and how to solve this problem on a
formal level to allow the automatisation of the analysis.
The reason for this question has a very practical ground:
any additional information about the system can make the
whole process slower, more expensive or even infeasible,
especially if we are speaking about verification. In the case of
model checking this can lead to the state explosion problem. In
the case of theorem proving this can lead to stack overflow or
excessive or prohibitive amounts of time needed by verification
engineers to complete the task.
On the logical level, this problem can be reformulated as
follows: What is the minimal part of model needed to check
a specific property? We suggest an approach focusing on data
and control flow dependencies between services. Dependen-
cies’ analysis results in a decomposition that gives rise to a
logical system architecture, which is the most appropriate for
the case of remote monitoring, testing and/or verification.
1Verisoft-XT project – http://www.verisoftxt.de/
In the case where the check of properties depends on infor-
mation in one location, obviously we can check the property
without remote connection and without sending system-wide
data for inclusion in the monitoring, testing, or verification
process. In the case of remote connection, an additional
problem arises through the need of transferring large amounts
of data, for example from sensor instruments or automated
test generators and model checkers. Thus, it is crucial to
analyse regarding to efficiency, which properties (or their parts)
should be checked locally, and which should be sent to the
cloud. Therefore, an appropriate model covering all these
aspects of remotely deployed distributed systems is needed
to fulfil the corresponding constraints and to make decisions
on (logical) service-oriented system architecture at least semi-
automatically.
Contributions: In this paper, we present a formal approach
that allows modelling of data and control flow dependen-
cies between services. The aim of the approach is to allow
decomposition oriented towards efficient checking of system
properties, also taking into account such characteristics as per-
formance, worst-case execution time, reliability, etc. Another
contribution of this approach is a semi-automatic support of
these ideas on verification level. Applying ideas introduced
in this paper within specification and proof methodology [3],
and taking into account human factor analysis [4], [5], we
obtain concise and at the same time readable specifications. To
support this approach on verification level, we have built the
corresponding set of theories in Higher-Order Logic. It allows
to check dependency relations using an interactive theorem
prover Isabelle/HOL [6]. To discharge proof goals automati-
cally, we apply Isabelle’s component Sledgehammer [7] that
employs resolution based first-order automatic theorem provers
(ATPs) and satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers.
II. INTER-/INTRASERVICE DEPENDENCIES
In this paper, we follow the definition of services intro-
duced in [8], where a service S is defined as a partial function
from input streams I(S) to output streams O(S). Thus, the
behaviour of a service can be defined partially (only for a
subset of its possible inputs), in contrast to the totality of
a component interface behaviour. In our approach, we need
only an abstract definition of a service: we focus on the
analysis of dependencies within and between services, where
the behaviour of a (sub)services can be specified using different
languages.
While modelling communication between services on a
certain abstraction level L (i.e. level of refinement/decompo-
sition), we specify the dependencies by the function
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SourcesL : CSetL → (CSetL set)
CSetL denotes here the set of services at the level L. SourcesL
returns for any service A the corresponding (possibly empty)
set of services that are the sources for the input streams of A.
More precisely, all the dependencies can be divided into the
direct and indirect ones. As a stream we understand here both
data and control flows. On the level of logical architecture, we
can see a stream as an abstract channel.
Similar to the function SourcesL, we define direct depen-
dencies by the function
DSourcesL : CSetL → (CSetL set)
For example, C1 ∈ DSourcesL(C2) simply means that at least
one of the output channels of C1 is directly connected to some
of input channels of C2. In more complicated situations, we
need to reason about the (transient) dependencies within many
or all of the services of the system.
The direct sources for C can be defined as follows:
DSourcesL(C) = {S | ∃ x ∈ I(C) ∧ x ∈ O(S)}
If we do not have to take into account the indirect dependen-
cies, the function SourcesL is defined to be equal to the function
DSourcesL, otherwise we define this function recursively over
the set of services using the following fixed point construction:
SourcesL(C) =
DSourcesL(C) ∪ ⋃S∈DSourcesL(C){S1 | S1 ∈ SourcesL(S)}
The functions DSourcesL(C) and SourcesL(C) have a number
of crucial properties. For example:
(1) If a service X does not belong to the DSourcesL set of any
service C of the system, it also does not belong to the SourcesL
set of any service C:
∀C ∈ CSetL. X 6∈ DSourcesL(C)⇒
∀C ∈ CSetL. X 6∈ SourcesL(C)
Thus, if C belongs to the SourcesL set of a service S, then
exist some service Z s.t. C belongs to its DSourcesL set (as a
special case, Z could also be equal to S):
C ∈ SourcesL(S)⇒ ∃Z. C ∈ DSourcesL(Z)
This also imply that if SourcesL set of a service C is empty,
its DSourcesL set is empty too, and vice versa:
SourcesL(C) = ∅⇔ DSourcesL(C) = ∅
(2) Transitivity: If a service C belongs to the SourcesL set of a
service S, which itself belongs to the SourcesL set of another
service Z, then the service C also belongs to the SourcesL set
of a service Z.
C ∈ SourcesL(S) ∧ S ∈ SourcesL(Z)⇒ C ∈ SourcesL(Z)
(3) If we have mutual dependencies between services, then
their SourcesL sets are equal and contain these services them-
selves (XS and ZS denote here some sets over CSetL):
SourcesL(C) = (XS ∪ SourcesL(S))∧
SourcesL(S) = (ZS ∪ SourcesL(C))
⇒ SourcesL(C) = SourcesL(S) = XS ∪ ZS ∪ {C, S}
In general, values of an output channel y ∈ O(C) of a
service C do not necessarily depend on the values of all its
input streams. This means that an optimisation of system/
services’ architecture may be needed in order to localise these
dependencies. To express any restrictions we use the following
notation: ID(C, y) denotes the subset of I(C) that y depends
upon. There are three possible cases to consider:
• y depends on all input streams of C: ID(C, y) = I(C);
• y depends on some input streams of C: ID(C, y) ⊂ I(C);
• y is independent of any input stream of C, i.e.,
ID(C, y) = ∅ 6= I(C).
While determining these sets, we should take into account
not only the direct dependence between input/output values,
but also the dependence via local variables of the service. For
example, let C be a service with a local variable st, representing
its current state, and an output channel y, which depends only
on the value of st. If st is updated depending to the input
messages the service receives via the input channel x, then
ID(C, y) = {x}. To be more precise, we mark this special
case by an upper index ID(C, y) = {x(st)} indicating that x
influences st, and y via st.
A. Elementary Services
Based on the definition above, we can decompose services
to have for each output channel the minimal sub service
computing the corresponding results (we call them elementary
services). An elementary service either
• should have a single output channel (in this case this
service can have no local variables), or
• all its output channels are correlated, i.e. mutually depend
on the same local variable(s).
Let C be a service with m input channels x1, . . . , xm and
n output channels y1, . . . , yn as well as k local variables
l1, . . . , lk. For each output channel yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n we check
the corresponding set ID(C, yi):
(1) If ID(C, yi) contains only direct dependencies from some
input channels, i.e. ID(C, yi) ⊆ I(C), we remove the corre-
sponding computations from C to a single subservice Ci, which
has a single output channel yi.
(2) If ID(C, yi) contains also dependencies via some local
variables, then we should check which other output channels
depend from these variables, because the output channels
depending from the same local variables will belong to the
same subservice of C, otherwise we will need duplicated
computation for these variables. Thus, we proceed as follows:
• If yi is the only output channel depending from these
variables, we remove the corresponding computations
from C to a single subservice Ci, which has a single
output channel yi.
• If there are other jm output channels yj1, . . . , yjm depend-
ing from these variables, we remove the corresponding
computations from C to a single subservice Ci, which
has jm+ 1 output channels yi, yj1, . . . , yjm.
For all three cases, ID(C, yi) becomes a set of input channels
of the new subservice Ci. If after this decomposition a single
service is too complex, we can apply the decomposition
strategy presented in [9].
B. Running Example
Let us illustrate the presented ideas by an example: we
show how each service can be decomposed to optimise the
dependencies within each single service, and after that we
optimise the architecture of the whole system. Given a system
S (cf. also Fig. 1) consisting of five services, where the set
CSet on the level L0 is defined by {A1, . . . ,A5}. The sets ID
of data and control flow dependencies between the services are
shown in Table I. We represent the dependencies graphically
using dashed lines over the service box.
A1	  
A2	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A4	  A3	  data2	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data5	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Fig. 1. System S: Dependencies and ID sets
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Fig. 2. Services’ decomposition (level L1)
Now we can decompose the system’s services according to the
given ID specification. This results into the next abstraction
level L1 of logical architecture (cf. Fig. 2), on which all
services are elementary:
A1 has two output channels, data2 depending on the input
channel data1 directly and data10 depending on the same
input channel but via a local variable st1. Therefore, it
should be decomposed in two subservices: A11 with input
data1 and output data2, and A12 with input data1 and
output data10.
A2 has four output channels: data5 and data11 depend on
the input channel data2 directly, the corresponding com-
putations should be removed to two subservice, A23 and
A21, respectively. data12 depends on the input channel
data3 via local variable st2, but there is another output
channel data4 depending on this local variable, therefore,
computations for these two outputs should belong to the
same subservice A22. Thus, A2 should be decomposed in
three subservices.
A3 has two output channels, data6 depending on the input
channel data4 directly and data7 depending on the input
channel data5 directly. Therefore, it should be decom-
posed in two subservices.
A4 has two output channels, data8 and data3. It should be
decomposed in two subservices, because data8 depends
on the input channel data13 directly and data3 depends
on the input channels data6 and data7 via local variable
st4.
A5 has only one output channel, which means that no de-
composition on this level is needed.
TABLE I. DEPENDENCIES WITHIN THE SYSTEM S
DSourcesL0 SourcesL0 ID
A1 ∅ ∅ data2 : {data1}
data10 : {datast11 }
A2 {A1,A4} {A1,A2,A3,A4} data4 : {data2, datast23 }
data5 : {data2}
data11 : {data2}
data12 : {datast23 }
A3 {A2} {A1,A2,A3,A4} data6 : {data4}
data7 : {data5}
A4 {A3} {A1,A2,A3,A4} data3 : {datast46 , datast47 }
data8 : {data13}
A5 {A4} {A1,A2,A3,A4} data9 : {data8}
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND TRACING
The functions SourcesL and ID allow us to trace back which
parts of the system provide information to a certain service.
This provides a basis for identifying of elementary services
and the corresponding optimisation of the logical architecture.
To trace which services are affected by the results produced
by the service, we introduce another two functions, OD and
AccL. For any service C, the function OD (dual to ID) returns
the corresponding set OD(C, x) of output channels depending
on input x. This help us to solve following problems:
• if there are some changes in the specification, properties,
constraints, etc. for x, we can trace which other channels
can be affected by these changes;
• having for each output channel the minimal subservice
computing the corresponding results, we can check the
critical paths in the system by allocating to each sub-
service /output channel the corresponding worst case
execution time (WCET). For this purpose we can use
representation of the system architecture as a directed
graph (cf. Section IV).
If the input part of the service’s interface is specified correctly
in the sense that the service does not have any “unused” input
channels, the following relation will hold:
∀ x ∈ I(C). OD(C, x) 6= ∅.
On each abstraction level L of logical architecture, we can
define a function AccL : CSetL → (CSetL set). For any
service (name) A the function AccL returns the corresponding
(possibly empty) set of services (names) B1, . . . ,BAN that are
the acceptors for the output streams of A. This function dual
to the function SourcesL:
x ∈ AccL(y)⇔ y ∈ SourcesL(x)
This model allows us to analyse the influence of a service’s
failure on the functionality of the overall system: if a service C
fails, the set of affected function will be AccL(C). For example,
for the system from Fig. 2, on the abstraction level L1 the
services A12, A21, A5, have no acceptors, where the set of
acceptors of the service A11 is {A21,A22,A23,A31,A32,A41}.
Thus, failure of the service A12 causes wrong behaviour only
of A12 itself, where failure of the service A12 has influence
on the results of seven services (including A12). On this
basis, we can mark each service C by a number of services
which are affected by C (and, respectively, by its failure).
Thus, the impact number of the service A12 will be 1 (the
minimal value), where the impact number of A11 will be 7.
Moreover, on this basis we can apply results of our previous
work on efficient hazard and impact analysis for automotive
mechatronics systems [10], which was done in collaboration
with industrial partners from ITK Engineering AG.
The representation of dependencies between services by a
directed graph (like on Fig. 3) allows also to find the worst case
execution time (WCET) needed for the concrete output based
on the WCETs of the system’s services, as well as analyse the
influence of a service’s failure on overall system. For example,
from Fig. 3 it is easy to see that for the outputs of the services
A11 and A12 the worst case computation time is equal to the
WCETs of these services, for the output of the services A21 the
worst case computation time is equal to the sum of WCETs
of A11 and A21, etc.
IV. STRONGLY CONNECTED SERVICES
After the decomposition discussed in the previous section,
we obtain a (flat) architecture of system. The main feature of
this architecture is that each output channel (within the system)
belongs the minimal subservice of a system computing the
corresponding results.
We represent this (flat) architecture as a directed graph and
apply one of the existing distributed algorithms for the de-
composition into its strongly connected services, e.g. FB [11],
OBF [12], or the colouring algorithm [13]. For our goals, we
extend them by a preliminary simplification of the graph (cf.
below). This optimisation is algorithm independent and is also
applicable for the case another decomposition is chosen.
Let us introduce some basic terms and definitions to explain
the main ideas of the decomposition we apply in our approach.
A directed graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a set of vertices,
and E ⊆ V ×V is a set of directed edges. If (u, v) ∈ E, then v
is called an successor of u, and u is called predecessor of v. A
vertex t is called reachable from vertex x if (x, t) ∈ E∗, where
E∗ is a transitive and reflexive closure of E. If xk is reachable
from x0, then there is a sequence of vertices x0, . . . , xk (called
path), such that for all 0 ≤ i < k (xi, xi+1) ∈ E.
A set of vertices SC ⊆ V is strongly connected if for any
vertices u, v ∈ CS holds that v is reachable from u. A strongly
connected service (SCS) is a maximal straggly connected set
of vertices, i.e. after extension of this set by any additional
vertex the set is no more strongly connected. An SCS is
trivial if it consists of a single vertex. We call an SCS leading
(terminating) trivial if it consists of a single vertex that has no
predecessors (successors).
In our representation of a flat architecture as a directed
graph, services become vertices and channels become edges.
We distinguish here
• channels that are system’s input/output (within the
graph, we represent them by dashed edges, cf. also
Fig. 3, because they are less important on this level of
(de)composition – we do not need to take them into
account by identifying the SCSs), and
• channels that are local for the system, i.e. representing
dependencies between services.
Vertices that are leading trivial SCSs are labeled by LT, vertices
that are terminating trivial SCSs are labeled by TT, and vertices
that are commonly trivial SCSs (trivial, but neither leading
nor terminating) are simply labeled by T. In addition, we
define another special king of trivial SCSs: services that has
neither successors, no predecessors (this means that all their
input/output channels are system’s input/output channels). We
call them disconnected trivial SCSs and label by DT.
Two vertices u and v of an undirected graph G are
connected if there is a path from u to v (for the case of
directed graph we need to ignore the orientation of its edges);
otherwise, they are disconnected. A graph G is connected if
every pair of vertices in G is connected; otherwise, it is called
disconnected. If the graph GL1 representing a flat system’s
architecture is disconnected, i.e. consists of N graphs that
are either connected graphs or single vertices (we denote this
set by GN), then we identify SCSs in each of these graphs
separately and could also parallelise these computations (cf.
also example below).
Thus, we start the service (de)composition by construction
the set GN from the system’s architecture on level L1. In the
case GL1 is connected, we simply have GN = {GL1}. Then
for each graph we proceed as follows:
(1) We identify DT services and delete these vertices from the
graph. This is non-recursive procedure with time complexity
O(n), where n is a number of vertices.
(2) We apply the recursive elimination technique One-Way-
Catch-Them-Young (OWCTY, [14]) to remove the LT services
and the reversed OWCTY technique to remove the TT services.
(3) The removed services become single services on the
level L2. To the rest of the graph, we apply one of the
existing algorithms for the decomposition into SCCs (FB [11],
OBF [12], etc.).
A11	   A21	  
A12	  
N
T
A22	  
A23	  
L
T
T
T
T T
A32	  
A31	  
A41	  
T
T
L
T
A42	  A5	  
G1	  
G2	  
Fig. 3. System S (level L1): detection of the strongly connected services
To illustrate these ideas, we continue with the example
from previous section. We represent the system from Fig. 2 as
a directed graph to apply a decomposition algorithm, cf. Fig. 3.
This graph is disconnected and consists of two connected
graphs, G1 and G2, therefore we can analyse them in parallel.
For G1 we need to perform the following steps:
(1) First of all, we identify A12 as a DT service, delete it from
the graph (system’s subservice S1 on the level L2).
(2) Then, we apply the OWCTY elimination techniques to
identify and remove the LT and TT services:
• On the first run of the algorithm, we identify A11 and A21
as an LT and an TT services respectively and delete them.
They become S2 and S3 on the level L2.
• After this, A23 (which is commonly trivial in G1) becomes
an LT service and should be deleted, becoming S4 on L2.
Then, the same situation will be with A32: it should be
deleted as an LT service and becomes S5.
• The rest of the graph (vertices A22, A31, A41) with
corresponding edges contains neither LT nor TT vertices.
This is an input for the SCC-decomposition algorithm.
(3) In our example we apply a variant of the FB algorithm.
The time complexity of this algorithm is O(n∗(n+m)), where
n is a number of vertices and m is the number of edges in this
graph. The FB algorithm identifies that the vertices A22, A31,
A41 build a single SCS, which becomes S6 on the level L2.
G2 has only two vertices, a leading trivial SCS A42 and a
terminating trivial SCS A5. Thus, on the level L2 it gives us
two subservices of the system: S7 and S8. Fig. 4 presents the
result of the architecture optimisation.
S6	  
S4	   S5	  
S7	  S8	  
S3	  
S2	  
S1	  
A11	  
A21	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A12	  
A22	  
data1	  
A41	  
A31	  data2	  
data3	  
data4	  
data5	  
data6	  
data7	  
data8	  
data9	  
A42	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st4 
st1 
data10	   data13	  
data11	  
A5	  
A32	  
data12	  
Fig. 4. Architecture of S (level L2)
V. EFFICIENT CHECKING OF PROPERTIES
A property can be represented by relations over data and
control flows on the system’s channels. Let for a relation r, Ir
and Or be the sets of input and output channels of the system
used in this relation. For each channel from Or we recursively
compute all the sets of the dependent input channels. Their
union, restricted to the input channels of the system (for the
case we exclude properties’ specification over local channels),
IDr should be equal to Ir, otherwise we should check whether
the property was specified correctly (i.e. exclude (human)
error in the specification of the property, e.g., when a wrong
channel identifier was used) and if so, precise it or eliminate
unnecessary constraints:
(1) If a channel x belongs to IDr but not to Ir, we need to
extend r explicitly specifying that this property should hold
for any values on x.
(2) If a channel x belongs to Ir but not to IDr , this means
that r is unnecessary strict, because it contains assumptions
on irrelevant input channel.
From Or we obtain the set OutCompr of services having
these channels as outputs, compute the union of corresponding
sets SourcesL2 . This union together with OutCompr give us
the minimal part of the system needed to check the property
r. This allowed us, especially in the case of cloud-supported
processing, to reduce the costs of monitoring, testing or
verification.
Assume we have to check relation r1(data10, data13) spec-
ified for the system presented on Fig. 4. It is easy to see, that
there is no dependency between data13 and data10. We have
here Ir1 = {data13} and Or1 = {data10}. data10 is a single
output channel of S1, i.e. O(S1) = {data10}. This gives us
OutCompr1 = S1. Thus, ID(S1, data10) = {data1} which is
already equal to IDr1 , because data1 is a system input. First of
all we need to exclude error in the specification of the property,
e.g. the case where r1 is meant to be specified over data10 and
data1. If r1 was specified without such errors, we need (1) to
extend it explicitly specifying that it should hold for any values
on data1, and (2) eliminate unnecessary constraints on data13
from r1. Because SourcesL2(S1) = ∅, we need only the service
S1 to check this property.
Assume now we have to check relation r2(data1, data12)
specified for the same system. For this case Ir2 = {data1} and
Or2 = {data12}.
data12 is a single output channel of S6, and therefore
OutCompr2 = S6.
ID(S6, data12) = {data2, data7} (both channels are local),
SourcesL2(S6) = {S2, S5}.
data2 ∈ O(S2), which gives us ID(S2, data2) = {data1} (this
is a system input channel, therefore it should be a part of IDr2 ).
SourcesL2(S2) = ∅.
data7 ∈ O(S5), ID(S5, data7) = {data5} (also local),
SourcesL2(S5) = {S4}.
data5 ∈ O(S4), ID(S4, data5) = {data2} (local, cf. above),
SourcesL2(S4) = ∅.
IDr2 = {data1} = Ir2 , there is no need to extend the property
or eliminate some to its constraints. To check this property we
need the following set of services:
OutCompr2 ∪SourcesL2(S6)∪SourcesL2(S2)∪SourcesL2(S5)∪
SourcesL2(S4) =
{S2, S4, S5, S6}.
VI. REMOTE COMPUTATION
In the previous section we have analysed, which part of
the overall information about the system and its input data is
necessary to check the corresponding property. In the similar
way, we can trace the influence of the system environment’s
properties on the properties of the system itself. However,
the decision, which information need to be processed locally
(local services) and which need to be sent to the cloud (remote
services), should be made not only according to this analysis
of a (logical) system architecture, but also taking into account
the following aspects of data flows between services:
(1) measure for costs of the data transfer/ upload to the cloud
UplSize(f): size of messages (data packages) within a data
flow f and frequency they are produced. This measure can be
defined on the level of logical modelling, where we already
know the general type of the data and can also analyse the
corresponding service (or environment) model to estimate the
frequency the data are produced;
(2) measure for requirement of using high-performance com-
puting and cloud virtual machines, Perf(X): complexity of the
computation within a service X, which can be estimated on
the level of logical modelling as well.
On this basis, we build a system architecture, optimised
for remote computation. We associate an UplSize measure to
each channel (to each data flow), and an Perf measure to
each elementary service in the system (i.e. for any service
on the abstraction level L1). A limit, above which a remote
computation is desired, is denoted by HighPerf. A limit of
the UplSize measure, above which a limited up-/download is
desired, is denoted by HighLoad, i.e. if the source of the data is
deployed locally then the receiving services should preferably
also deployed locally, and i.e. if the source is deployed in
the cloud then the receiving services should preferably also
deployed in the cloud. We do not take into account costs of
the transfer of software service themselves, assuming that this
aspect is already covered by the Perf measure. The UplSize
measure should be analysed only for the channels that aren’t
local for the services on abstraction level L2.
Using graphical representation, we denote channels with
UplSize  HighLoad by thick red arrows, and the services
with Perf  HighPerf by white colour, where all other
channel and services are marked blue. We use the same
colouring notation when building the corresponding tables for
the values above limits as well as when represented a system
by the corresponding directed graph. For the compressed table
representation, which allows readable representation of the
large systems’ measures, we omit the concrete values of the
measures leaving only the notes on relations to the defined
limits. While measuring Perf on the level L1, we mark a
service by a sum of Perf measures of its subservices on the
level L2. Thus, if the Perf measure of at least one subservice
is high, the same hold for the service’s Perf.
This analysis can also be done automatically, provided all
the measures UplSize and Perf are defined for data and control
flows as well as for (elementary) services. Using our approach,
we can prove a number of properties for service composition
according to these measures. We start with the architecture
from abstraction level L2 and represent it as a directed graph.
Then we simply remove edges that correspond to channels
with low UplSize, and obtain a set of connected graphs. If any
two vertices (or graphs) are “connected” by a single edge that
is “split” and has no source vertex (this represents a situation
where a system input goes to many systems’s services), we see
them as a connected graph too. Each of the graphs becomes
a service on the abstraction level L3 represents a system
architecture, optimised for remote computation.
Assume the following case for the system S from the previous
examples (cf. also Fig. 4):
• channels with UplSize value  HighLoad:
data1, data4, data5, data6, data7, data8.
S2	   S3	  
S1	  
S6	  
S4	   S5	  
S9	  S8	  
GL2	   GL2’	  
S2	   S3	  
S1	  
S6	  
S4	   S5	   S9	  
S8	  
Fig. 5. Service (de)composition according to the channel measures UplSize
• services with Perf value HighPerf : A22, A23, A41, A42,
and on the abstraction level L2: S2, S4, S6, S7.
data4 and data6 are local channels of S6, their UplSize measure
is not relevant for this case. We represent the system from the
abstraction level L2 as a directed graph GL2 (cf. Fig. 5). After
removing edges that correspond to channels with low UplSize,
we obtain a set GL′2 of connected graphs.
S1’	  
A11	  
S4’	  
S7’	  
S3	  
A21	  
A23	  
A12	  
A22	  
data1	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A31	  
data2	  
data3	  
data4	  
data5	  
data6	  
data7	  
data8	  
data9	  
A42	  
st2 
st4 
st1 
data10	  
data13	  
data11	  
A5	  
A32	  
data12	  
Fig. 6. Optimised architecture of S (Level L3)
Fig. 6 represents a system architecture, optimised for remote
computation. On the abstraction level L3 (cf. Fig. 6), S1
and S2 are composed together into a new service S′1: data1
corresponds to a data flow, where messages (data packages)
have large size and come with a high frequency, but data2
has very low frequency (e.g., S2 realise a filtering function
according to a given criteria), therefore it make more sense to
deploy S1 locally, together with S2.
There are no changes for service S3, but S4, S5, and S6 are
composed into S′4, and S7 with S8 into S
′
7. The services S
′
4 and
S′7 have Perf measure higher HighPerf, therefore using high-
performance computing and cloud virtual machines is required
for these services.
VII. SEMI-AUTOMATIC FORMAL VERIFICATION
To support this approach on verification level, we have also
build a set of corresponding theories in Higher-Order Logic
(HOL) using an interactive semi-automatic theorem prover
(proof assistant) Isabelle [6]. This proof assistant is based
on polymorphic HOL extended with axiomatic type classes,
and support the proof of arbitrary mathematical theorems in
interactive manner. Proofs are constructed in the structured
proof language Isar [15]. The advantage of this proof language
is that the proofs are easy readable for both human and
machine, which is not the case for many proof languages.
The representation of our approach in Isabelle/HOL con-
tains approx. 70 general axioms and lemmas [16], which
are necessary to analyse dependencies within a system using
Isabelle in (semi-)automatic way, e.g. to verify whether a given
set of services is equal to the set of (in)direct sources of some
service, or whether the set of services is equal to the minimal
set needed to check a certain property. To show a feasibility
of the approach, we also have done a case study using our
formalisation. In this case study [16], we started with 9 services
connected with 24 channels on the abstraction level L0 (among
them 4 services are specified using local variables). Fig. 7
presents how the number of services was changed among the
abstraction levels.
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Fig. 7. Correlation between the number of services and abstraction levels:
Case study an the running example (cf. Section II-B)
Overall, the case study contains more than 300 lemmas,
approx. 50% of them can be composed and proven auto-
matically, using the predefined schema, which is a part of
our formalisation. All the technical details of formalisation
within the theorem prover Isabelle as well as the corresponding
proofs for a case study to elaborate the approach are presented
in [16]. Approx. 90% of the proofs (general as well as
for a concrete system from the case study) are constructed
using Isabelle’s component Sledgehammer [7]. Sledgehammer
discharges proof goals applying to them resolution based
first-order automatic theorem provers (ATPs) and satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT), which makes the human-related part
of the proof simpler and faster.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The approach presented above extends our previous work
in [1], [2], [9] by providing (i) formal approach that allows
modelling of (data and control flow) dependencies between
components, and (ii) associated algorithm for architecture
optimisation towards efficient verification, testing, and mon-
itoring of system’s properties. We leave here out of scope the
automatisation of the construction of the functions ID, OD,
etc. for a concrete case. For the example presented in this
paper as well as for the case study, verified in Isabelle, these
functions were specified manually. Thus, this automatisation is
planned for the future work. However, one of the advantages
of our current work is formal semi-automatic analysis of (i)
system architecture, and (ii) the sufficiency of the set of
system’s components to check a certain property. Thus, in
our work we touch the following research areas: modelling
communication between components, system decomposition,
as well as architecture modelling. In the rest of the section we
discuss the related work on them.
Modelling communication: Various languages and tech-
niques have been proposed to represent communication be-
tween components/processes, for example, Bergstra’s Alge-
bra of Communicating Processes [17], Hoare’s approach on
Communicating Sequential Processes [18] and its extension
[19]. Magee et al. [20] tried to combine the ideas of opera-
tional semantics with Milner’s pi calculus, calculus of mobile
processes (cf. [21], [22]). Reo, a channel-based coordination
model for component composition, represents a co-algebraic
view on this area [23], [24]. The work presented in [25] defines
an extensive support to the components communication and
time requirements, while the model discussed in [26] proposes
general ideas on model for distributed automation systems.
Our approach, in contrast, is focusing not on the communi-
cation in general but on the dependency aspects and how their
analysis can be used to increase the efficiency of properties
checking.
System decomposition. There is a large number of ap-
proaches in the area of systems decomposition (see, e.g., [27],
[28]). In general we can say, that decomposition in many cases
leads to a refinement of a system, where by composing a
system from components we can implicitly build a new level
of abstraction of system representation (cf. [29], [30]).
The main difference and the main contribution of our
current work, also compared with our previous work on formal
decomposition [9], is (i) an extension of the specification
approach to associate subspecifications with subservices or
architectural components in a more usable, readable way, (ii)
focusing on the aspects essential for the efficient checking of
system’s properties, (iii) taking into account aspects that are
important for the case of using high-performance computing
and cloud virtual machines. To this end, our focus in the
current paper goes also beyond ideas presented in [9], where
readability and manageability of specification were discussed
in relation to inconsistencies and incomplete specifications.
Architecture modelling. An introductory overview of foun-
dations and applications of the model driven architecture can
be found in [31]. There is a large collection of approaches
on architecture elaboration, with different aims and domain
orientations, e.g., Medvidovic and Taylor [32] introduce a
classification and comparison framework for software archi-
tecture description languages, Malek et al. [33] presents a
framework for improving distributed system’s architecture
and their deployment, Broy et al. [8] focus on specification
and design of services and layered architectures. A number
of approaches, e.g., [34], propose several meta-models that
introduce relationships between architectural design decision
alternatives and activities related to them. A number of archi-
tecture description languages have been developed to specify
compositional views of a system on an abstract level, e.g.,
TrustME [35], which combines software architecture specifi-
cation approaches with ideas of design-by-contract and allows
capturing of behavioural interaction patterns between large-
scale components of software and systems architectures.
Our current work is focused on modelling of a logical
service-oriented architecture. The main focus of our approach
is on elaborating for a concrete system, which part of the
system is sufficient to check a certain property, and how to
optimise the logical architecture towards efficient monitoring,
testing, and verification of system’s properties, also for the
case of remote connection.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a formal approach to modelling
and analysis data and control flow dependencies between
components. We described the theory which lies behind the
approach and presented a running example to illustrate the
main ideas of the approach. We conclude that our approach
allows
• to specify the dependencies within a system formally,
• to elaborate for a concrete system, which part of the
system is sufficient to check a certain property,
• to analyse tracing and reliability aspects,
• to optimise the architecture of a given system, also taking
into account such aspects as (i) costs of data transfer/
upload to the cloud, and (ii) requirements of using high-
performance computing and cloud virtual machines,
These results are especially important for analysis and op-
timisation of remotely deployed distributed control systems:
our approach allows system decomposition oriented towards
efficient checking of system properties – it allows to send to
or from the cloud only the information really needed for the
monitoring, testing or verification of the properties of interest.
Another contribution of our approach is a semi-automatic
support of the presented ideas on verification level, an inter-
active semi-automatic theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
Future Work: In the future work, we intent to automatise
the construction of the functions that specify the dependencies
(ID, OD, etc.) for a concrete case on each level of abstraction.
One of the other possible directions of our future work
is on combination of the ideas presented above with our
previous work on analysis of crypto-based components [36],
to analyse the data dependencies between components wrt.
secrecy/security properties.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Feilkas, F. Ho¨lzl, C. Pfaller, S. Rittmann, K. Scheidemann,
M. Spichkova, and D. Trachtenherz, “A Top-Down Methodology for
the Development of Automotive Software,” TU Mu¨nchen, Tech. Rep.
TUM-I0902, 2009.
[2] M. Spichkova, “Architecture: Methodology of decomposition,” TU
Mu¨nchen, Tech. Rep. TUM-I1018, 2010.
[3] ——, “Stream Processing Components: Isabelle/HOL Formalisation
and Case Studies,” Archive of Formal Proofs, 2013, Formal proof
development.
[4] ——, Design of formal languages and interfaces: “Formal” does not
mean “unreadable”, K. Blashki and P. Isaias, Eds. IGI Global, 2013.
[5] ——, “Human Factors of Formal Methods,” in In IADIS Interfaces and
Human Computer Interaction 2012. IHCI 2012, 2012.
[6] T. Nipkow, L. C. Paulson, and M. Wenzel, Isabelle/HOL – A Proof
Assistant for Higher-Order Logic, ser. LNCS. Springer, 2002, vol.
2283.
[7] J. C. Blanchette, S. Bo¨hme, and L. C. Paulson, “Extending Sledgeham-
mer with SMT solvers,” in Automated Deduction, ser. LNCS, N. Børner
and V. Sofronie-Stokkermans, Eds., vol. 6803. Springer, 2011, pp.
116–130.
[8] M. Broy, “Service-oriented Systems Engineering: Specification and
design of services and layered architectures. The JANUS Approach,”
Engineering Theories of Software Intensive Systems, pp. 47–81, 2005.
[9] M. Spichkova, “Architecture: Requirements + Decomposition + Refine-
ment,” Softwaretechnik-Trends, vol. 31:4, 2011.
[10] S. Dobi, M. Gleirscher, M. Spichkova, and P. Struss, “Model-based
hazard and impact analysis,” TU Mu¨nchen, Tech. Rep. TUM-I1333,
2013.
[11] L. Fleischer, B. Hendrickson, and A. Po˜nar, “On identifying strongly
connected components in parallel,” in Parallel and Distributed Process-
ing, ser. LNCS, J. Rolim, Ed. Springer, 2000, vol. 1800, pp. 505–511.
[12] J. Barnat, J. Chaloupka, and J. van de Pol, “Improved distributed
algorithms for scc decomposition,” Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci.,
vol. 198, no. 1, pp. 63–77, 2008.
[13] S. M. Orzan, “On distributed verification and verified distribution,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Free University of Amsterdam, 2004.
[14] K. Fisler, R. Fraer, G. Kamhi, M. Vardi, and Z. Yang, “Is there a
best symbolic cycle-detection algorithm?” in Tools and Algorithms for
the Construction and Analysis of Systems, ser. LNCS, T. Margaria and
W. Yi, Eds. Springer, 2001, vol. 2031, pp. 420–434.
[15] M. Wenzel, “The isabelle/isar reference manual,” 2013.
[16] M. Spichkova, “Formalisation and analysis of component dependen-
cies,” Archive of Formal Proofs, 2014, Formal proof development.
[17] J. A. Bergstra and J. W. Klop, “Algebra of communicating processes
with abstraction,” Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 37, pp. 77–121, 1985.
[18] C. A. R. Hoare, “Communicating sequential processes,” Commun. ACM,
vol. 21, no. 8, pp. 666–677, Aug. 1978.
[19] G. Hilderink, “Graphical modelling language for specifying concur-
rency based on csp,” IEEE: Software, vol. 150, pp. 108–120, 2003.
[20] J. Magee, N. Dulay, S. Eisenbach, and J. Kramer, “Specifying dis-
tributed software architectures,” in Proceedings of the 5th European
Software Engineering Conference. Springer, 1995, pp. 137–153.
[21] R. Milner, A Calculus of Communicating Systems. Springer, 1982.
[22] ——, Communicating and mobile systems - the Pi-calculus. Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
[23] F. Arbab, “Reo: a channel-based coordination model for component
composition,” Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, vol. 14,
pp. 329–366, 6 2004.
[24] S. Meng, F. Arbab, B. Aichernig, L. Astefanoaei, F. de Boer, and
J. Rutten, “Connectors as designs: Modeling, refinement and test case
generation,” Science of Computer Programming, vol. 77, no. 7-8, 2012.
[25] B. Vogel-Heuser, F. S., T. Werner, and C. Diedrich, “Modeling net-
work architecture and time behavior of distributed control systems in
industrial plant,” in 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial
Electronics Society, ser. IECON, 2011.
[26] T. Hadlich, C. Diedrich, K. Eckert, T. Frank, A. Fay, and B. Vogel-
Heuser, “Common communication model for distributed automation
systems,” in 9th IEEE International Conference on Industrial Infor-
matics, ser. IEEE INDIN, 2011.
[27] J. Philipps and B. Rumpe, “Refinement of Pipe-and-Filter Architec-
tures,” in FM’99, J. M. Wing, J. Woodcock, and J. Davies, Eds., no.
LNCS 1708. Springer, 1999, pp. 96 – 115.
[28] D. B. da Cruz and B. Penzenstadler, “Designing, Documenting, and
Evaluating Software Architecture,” TU Mu¨nchen, Tech. Rep. TUM-
I0818, 2008.
[29] M. Broy, “Compositional refinement of interactive systems,” ACM,
vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 850–891, 1997.
[30] M. Spichkova, “Refinement-based verification of interactive real-time
systems,” Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 214,
pp. 131–157, 2008.
[31] A. Rensink and J. Warmer, Eds., Model Driven Architecture - Founda-
tions and Applications, ser. LNCS, vol. 4066. Springer, 2006.
[32] N. Medvidovic and R. Taylor, “A classification and comparison frame-
work for software architecture description languages,” IEEE Trans.
Softw. Eng., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 70–93, 2000.
[33] S. Malek, N. Medvidovic, and M. Mikic-Rakic, “An extensible frame-
work for improving a distributed software system’s deployment archi-
tecture,” IEEE Trans. Software Eng., vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 73–100, 2012.
[34] J. Tyree and A. Akerman, “Architecture decisions: demystifying archi-
tecture,” Software, IEEE, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 19–27, 2005.
[35] H. Schmidt, I. Poernomo, and R. Reussner, “Trust-by-contract: Mod-
elling, analysing and predicting behaviour of software architectures,” J.
Integr. Des. Process Sci., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 25–51, Aug. 2001.
[36] M. Spichkova, “Compositional properties of crypto-based components,”
Archive of Formal Proofs, 2014, Formal proof development.
